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WHAT FEDERAL PROSECUTORS REALLY THINK:
THE PUZZLE OF STATISTICAL RACE DISPARITY




In the face of well-established statistical race disparity in the admin-
istration of every capital punishment regime in the United States,1 the
continued prosecution of death penalty cases is a puzzle to some.
"How can they do that?" think those opposed to capital punishment,
of prosecutors in death penalty cases. "Don't they care about race
disparity or systemic racial bias? What can they be thinking?"
I imagine many people attending DePaul University College of
Law's powerful Race to Execution Symposium in October 2003 har-
bored this puzzled view. However, let me assure you, the view from
the "other side"-of prosecutors handling serious death penalty pros-
ecutions-is just as puzzled. "There is no evidence of race bias in my
case," such prosecutors think. "And the person I am prosecuting
committed not just murder, but an aggravated murder, a heinous mur-
der (or murders). Indeed, I am prosecuting the moral equivalent of
Timothy McVeigh. ' '2 Puzzled, those prosecutors wonder: "Do they
really expect me to drop the prosecution of Timothy McVeigh because
some other cases-not mine-have generated statistical race dispari-
ties? Do they really think that this heinous, guilty murderer should be
let go? What can they be thinking?"
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law (U.C.). My heartfelt thanks to Professors
Susan Bandes and Andrea Lyon for their comments and the original invitation to deliver this
paper on October 24, 2003 at the powerful Race to Execution Symposium at the DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law: to Janet Bateman, Hastings Class of 2005 and Assistant Librarian Chuck
Marcus, for research assistance and support; and to Beverly Taylor for indefatigable clerical
support. Helpful comments from Ash Bhagwat, Evan Lee, Keith Wingate, Janet Bateman and
Carol Chodroff saved me from some, but obviously not all, error.
1. "Statistical race disparity" means, simply, that the percentage of defendants sentenced to
death, who are African-American, greatly exceeds the percentage (roughly 13%) of African
Americans in the general population. See infra text accompanying notes 4-28.
2. Timothy McVeigh was executed by federal authorities in 2001 for the notorious Oklahoma
City federal building bombing in 1995, which claimed 168 lives and is the most serious episode of
domestic terrorism in this country's history (the World Trade Center destruction being interna-
tional terrorism). See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
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At the Symposium, we heard a variety of eloquent responses to
such puzzled prosecutorial thoughts. We also heard about, but did not
hear from, death penalty prosecutors. I suppose that is why I was in-
vited. 3 This Essay addresses one group of perceivedly "incomprehen-
sible" death penalty prosecutors: those who handle federal cases.
Without advocating or opposing capital punishment as an absolute
matter, I address the question: What do federal prosecutors really
think about race and the federal death penalty?
II. GENERAL THOUGHTS ABOUT RACE DISPARITY AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Five years ago, in 1999, I published a study revealing the now well
accepted race disparity statistics generated by the "new" (since 1988)
federal death penalty process. 4 In September 2000, the Department
of Justice issued its own study, confirming the "disturbing" 5 facts that
still persist: although the samples are still relatively small,6 persons of
an ethnic minority continue to compose about 67% of all federal
death defendants; about 60% are African American. 7 As Kevin Mc-
Nally forcefully demonstrated at the Symposium, the statistics about
race and the federal death penalty have not changed."
Of course, given their small number, the statistics on federal execu-
tions prove nothing at all. There have been only three federal execu-
tions in the past forty years, all since the federal death penalty was
3. Before joining the Hastings faculty, I served as a federal prosecutor from 1987 to 1994.
More relevantly, I served on the Attorney General's Capital Case Review Committee as an
Associate Deputy Attorney General at the United States Department of Justice in 1996 to 1997,
recommending the filing, or not, of death penalty notices in federal cases submitted by U.S.
Attorneys from around the country.
4. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Depart-
ment of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 476-90 (1999) [hereinafter Little, History].
See also Rory K. Little, Why A Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791. 808-
09 (2001) [hereinafter Little, Moratorium].
5. See Marc Lacey & Raymond Bonner, Reno Troubled by Death Penalty Statistics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2000, at A17 (also quoting Eric Holder, the Deputy Attorney General (who is
also African American), as being "personally and professionally disturbed" in reaction to the
2000 Department of Justice report).
6. Compared to the 3,500 plus persons on stateside death rows in 2002, and the 603 in Califor-
nia alone, there are only twenty-seven people from all states on federal death row as of June
2004. See "Federal Death Row, List of Prisoners," in the "Federal Death Penalty" section of the
Death Penalty Information Organization's website, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last vis-
ited June 2, 2004) [hereinafter DPIC website].
7. Little, History, supra note , at 349-50, 355. Of the twenty-seven persons currently on fed-
eral death row, it is reported that seventeen (63%) are black, nine are white, and one is native-
American. DPIC website, supra note 6.
8. See Kevin McNally, Race and Federal Death Penalty: A Nonexistent Problem Gets Worse,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1615 (2004).
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revived in 1988 and given wide effect in 1994:9 Timothy McVeigh and
Juan Garza in 2001 and Louis Jones in 2003-one Caucasian, one La-
tino, and one African American.'0 As I have previously noted, the
federal government is really just a "bit player" in the larger drama of
capital punishment in the United States today.1 Nevertheless, I rec-
ognize the symbolic and "modeling" importance of the federal gov-
ernment, here as elsewhere.' 2 Thus, it is appropriate to examine the
thought processes of federal capital prosecutors.
It may also be noted that the race disparity statistics of federal capi-
tal punishment have not always been this way.13 There has always
been a federal death penalty-the framers so provided in 1790, only
months after the Union was formed.14 From 1811 to 1870, only 16%
of the sixty-two recorded federal executions 15 were of African-Ameri-
can defendants. 16 Over 53% were of white defendants, and the rest
(over 30%) were of "other" minorities, most likely Native Americans
("Indians").1 7
Notably, once slaves were granted legal citizenship by the federal
government, and Reconstruction efforts were having their mixed suc-
cesses, executions of ethnic minorities soared, to roughly 75% of the
total from 1871 through 1890 and 68% from 1871 through 1950.
9. From Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), until the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994,
only one rarely employed federal crime, "Continuing Criminal [Narcotics] Enterprise," enacted
in 1988, permitted a federal death penalty. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1988). The 1994 Federal Death
Penalty Act ("FDPA") 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598, and subsequent Acts, have now extended the
death penalty to dozens of federal crimes, so that the penalty is now available for virtually any
federal offense that includes a nonnegligent homicide. See Little, History, supra note 4, at 391;
DPIC website, supra note 6 (listing death-eligible federal offenses).
10. DPIC website, supra note 6 (Execution Database, search for "Federal executions").
11. See Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 529,
537, 577 (2000) [hereinafter Little, Future].
12. Id. at 537, 577-79.
13. Accord McNally, supra note 8, at 1615 ("Historically, the federal death penalty resulted in
executions in roughly the same percentage as racial groups in the population."). Similarly, Pro-
fessor William Stuntz has noted that racial imbalance in prison populations increased dramati-
cally in the 1960s and again in the 1980s, with the black prison population increasing from
roughly 37% in 1960 to over 50% by 1997. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, 88 COLUM.
L. REV 1795, 1796 n.2 (1998).
14. See Little, History, supra note 4, at 349, 363, 368.
15. The following statistics are based on the extensive and remarkable (if idiosyncratic)
database of American criminal executions from 1608 to 1987, compiled by M. Watt Espy and
John Ortiz Smylka and known as "The Espy Files," available on the DPIC website, supra note 6.
My research assistant, Janet Bateman, and I have compiled the federal executions data as identi-
fied in the Espy files. A chart identifying and counting soley federal executions reported in the
Espy files is on file with the author.
16. Of course, this relatively low number of African-American executions may have been due
to "extra-legal" executions of blacks during this largely slave period.
17. DPIC website, supra note 6.
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Moreover, after the federal execution of fifty-three persons in the
"other" ethnicity category during Reconstruction (1871-1890), the
"other" category-minority persons other than African-Americans-
became trivially small in the twentieth century, with only three such
"other" persons executed federally from 1911 until Juan Garza was
executed in 2001. Meanwhile, a total of 112 persons appear to have
been executed federally in the 20th century. 18 Of this number, sev-
enty-eight were in the District of Columbia, which probably should be
considered local rather than federal, as analogous to state executions
for nonfederal crimes such as plain murder, because of the absence of
parallel state criminal law enforcement authorities and the exclusivity
of federal control there. 19 Of the remaining thirty-four federal execu-
tions in 20th century, twenty-seven were white, four were black, two
were Hispanic, and two Native Americans. Thus, outside of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, federal executions were reserved largely for white
offenders throughout the 20th century.
Also sometimes lost in this debate is the point that the term "dis-
parity" itself is a somewhat loaded term because it is dependant on
the baseline measure to which one compares the ethnicity of capital
defendants. That is, by the last census, African Americans make up
less than 13% of the general population, while whites make up 71%.20
If one assumes that these percentages should be similarly reflected in
the capital punishment pool,21 then "statistical disparity" is well borne
out.
Even sympathetic observers, however, like Professor David Baldus,
have noted that the general population comparison can be "highly
misleading because it fails to control for the disproportionality high
percentage of blacks (about 55%) among citizens arrested for homi-
cide nationally. '22 Thus, critics have suggested that the proper com-
18. Again, these statistics come from examination of the Espy compilation, findable at DPIC
website, supra note 6. A chart identifying and counting solely federal executions is on file with
the author.
19. Of the seventy-eight executed defendants in the District of Columbia, fifty-nine were
black and nineteen were white, a likely revealing statistical imbalance even considering the Dis-
trict's large African-American population.
20. POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION ESTIMATES OF THE
UNITED STATES BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, available at http://www.census.gov/popu-
lation/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt (last visited Apr. 15, 2004); see Little, Moratorium, supra
note 4, at 808 n. 116.
21. But cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1996) (rejecting such presump-
tions unless supported by "reliable statistics").
22. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1656 (1998).
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parison should not be to general population statistics, but to the more
limited set of African Americans and other persons who commit vio-
lent felonies, or murders, likely to lead to capital prosecution.23 This
latter statistic is hard to establish with any certainty; calculations ap-
pear to range from high to low, depending as much on the politics of
the statistician as any other variable. Nevertheless, the general claim
that a higher percentage of African Americans than their 13% general
population figure are charged with, or convicted of, violent felonies
seems to be well accepted even by critics. 24 Thus, over 51% of per-
sons convicted of homicide, from 1976 through 2000, were black.25
And about 38% of all violent crime arrestees are black. 26 These sta-
tistics are not so out-of-step with a federal capital "pool" of African
Americans at 45%.
In rejoinder, however, thoughtful observers like Professors David
Harris and David Cole remind us that arrest statistics can themselves
be misleading-the product of an allegedly biased law enforcement
system.27 That is, arrests and convictions of many African Americans
for homicide could be the product of a racially-biased system-in
which whites are not arrested or prosecuted for the same offenses as
blacks-rather than an indication of innate offender rates. If the
criminal justice system is shot through with racial bias as some
charge-from the investigative and initial charging stages through jury
verdicts and appeal-then statistics generated by that system are not
bias-free. In short, "one must remember.., to exercise caution when
using statistics in the debates on crime, in any direction. '28 To move
23. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Political Geography of Race Data in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2003). The eight articles in this recent issue of Law &
Contemporary Problems, addressing The New Data: Over-Representation of Minorities in the
Criminal Justice System, see 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2003), provide an excellent picture of
the current statistics, issues, and scholarly thinking in this area.
24. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 145 (1997); MICHAEL H. TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 34 (1995); cf. Susan R. Klein
& Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 223,
237 ("[C]ertain federal crimes committed disproportionately by African-Americans are punished
more severely than crimes committed disproportionately by whites .... ).
25. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.,
TRENDS BY RACE (2001).
26. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 356 (2002). Also, over 46% of the vic-
tims in homicides were black. Id. As Professor Kennedy has noted, racial minorities are dispro-
portionately victimized by crime as well. KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 145.
27. David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of
Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 80-81 (2003); see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 150-51 (1999).
28. Harris, supra note 27, at 72.
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our current discussion forward, I propose to simply assume the valid-
ity of the statistical race disparity claim at some basic level.
III. I HOPE You WILL AGREE: NOT ALL SUPPORTERS OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ARE RACISTS
Before I dive completely into the brains of federal prosecutors, I
want to briefly mention another race disparity in the capital punish-
ment debate, and then beg your indulgence of my further remarks.
As reported in a recent article provocatively entitled "Why Do White
Americans Support the Death Penalty?," there is also a racial divide
in capital punishment opinion between white and black Americans.29
If we can trust public opinion polls at all, they consistently show that
opposition to capital punishment runs around 45% to 55% for black
Americans, while for whites it is much lower, ranging from 17% in
1992 to 24% in 2000.30 That is, opposition to the death penalty is
about twice as high among black Americans as among white, and a
much larger majority of whites than blacks support the death penalty.
(However, it is also important to note that these figures also suggest
that a substantial minority of black Americans-at least 40%, if not
more-supports capital punishment. This is a separate, fascinating
point in its own right-even more so, perhaps, when it is compared to
other polls indicating that over 65% of blacks believe the criminal jus-
tice system is racist.31)
This racial opinion divide may or may not surprise you. However,
far more controversially, this recent article goes on to claim that the
high support among white Americans for capital punishment is a
product of what the authors call "anti-black attitudes," even when
controlled for other personality traits likely to yield support for the
death penalty.32 I think there are deep flaws in the Soss article; I do
29. Joe Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death Penalty?, 65 J. POL. 397
(2003).
30. Id. at 399 n.2 ("In 2000, black opposition stood firm at 45%."); Pew Research Center poll,
July 2003, available at DPIC website, supra note 6 ("55% of African-Americans oppose capital
punishment, and 39% favor its use."). Presumably, the remaining 6% were "undecided."
31. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 699 & n.115 (1995).
32. Soss, supra note 29, at 400, 409, 414-15, 416. Ironically, if it is true that "white racists are
more likely [to] support the death penalty," it is somewhat self-defeating, because the majority
of persons executed annually in the United States are, in fact, white, as are the majority of
persons on death row. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT STATISTICS, available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp/htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003). In 2002, fifty-eight of the seventy-one persons executed were white; of those on death
row, 1,969 were white, 1,538 were black (and seventy-four were "other"). However, I am not
ready to accept the claim that support for capital punishment is invariably racist. Indeed, the
[Vol. 53:15911596
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not recommend it as a model of dispassionate scholarship. Neverthe-
less, I am somewhat intimidated by the "strong" version of this claim.
Does it mean that any white person who supports the death penalty is
a racist? If so, then should my voice, as a white person not invariably
opposed to capital punishment, be silenced before I speak? I am con-
fident that at DePaul, with its rich intellectual history and diverse
community, the simplistic "racist" label will not be speedily, or
thoughtlessly, launched. I urge you to show tolerance for the possibil-
ity, at least, that nonopposition to the death penalty might be based
on more neutral, fair-minded principles than this claim would suggest,
because if you believe that any white American who supports any ver-
sion of capital punishment must be, at bottom, a racist, then you can-
not "hear" my views and pragmatic progress on the issues seems
impossible. 33
Moreover, the "white racist" claim overlooks, not only other princi-
pled rationales for capital punishment, but also the near majority of
black Americans who also say they do not oppose capital punish-
ment.34 The authors of the Soss article might do better to address the
question: "Why Do Black Americans Support the Death Penalty?"
The answers to that question might be more helpful to advance our
debate in terms of examining the broad, persistent support for capital
punishment in this country. The fact is, in the minds of many Ameri-
cans, black or white, extremely aggravated killings simply cry out for a
morally equivalent penalty.35 The "racist" charge overlooks the possi-
bility that other rationales, besides racist ones, may lead to support for
at least some version of capital punishment. 36 I ask you to please not
dismiss me as a racist before you hear me out. While I cannot escape
large percentage of African Americans that also supports capital punishment, see note 30 supra,
undercuts this claim.
33. "Hear" is used as in the sense of actually listening to their content and giving them an
unbiased evaluation.
34. This combines the 40% or more who say they support capital punishment and the 5%, or
so, who say they are undecided or give no response. See note 30 supra.
35. See ScoT-r TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 64 (2003) (some say "that it denigrates the profound indiginity of
murder to punish it in the same fashion as other crimes"). Thus it is the consistent finding of
statistical race disparity studies that any racial effect disappears when only "high end" aggra-
vated murders are considered. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366-67 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 51, 145, 171, 318, 385 (1990).
36. Indeed, Soss and his co-authors apparently agree, although they do not highlight this in
their brief, provocative article. See Soss, supra note 29, at 411 ("No single factor, taken alone,
can explain why most white [and, the authors fail to note, many black] people support capital
punishment ... [A] variety of nonracial attitudes and motives drive white [and black] opinion in
this policy area" [emphasis added].)
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the subconscious biases that any person in any identifiable subgroup
may have, I believe my views are founded largely on nonracial consid-
erations. My personal and political perspective is one of a moderate
from San Francisco, who hopes his old boss, Justice William J. Bren-
nan Jr., is looking on kindly, if not entirely approvingly, from above.37
IV. FURTHER THROAT-CLEARING: RACE DISPARITIES AND
UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL EMPATHY
This Article does not require further examination of the validity of
the statistical bases for the race disparity claim in the capital punish-
ment debate; indeed, I want to assume today that the worst-case inter-
pretations are true. Assuming that race disparity in capital
punishment is a reality, and that it is indeed disturbing, I want to pur-
sue a different question: Why do federal prosecutors, aware of these
disturbing statistics, nevertheless believe that pursuing federal death
penalty prosecutions is okay? In other words, if we assume that the
statistics showing race disparity in administration of capital punish-
ment are well settled, then many people wonder "How can they do
that? How can prosecutors keep sending [minority] defendants to
federal death row?"38 Or, to put the thought another way, rather than
go forward with current capital prosecutions, why not impose a mora-
torium on all federal death penalty prosecutions and executions while
we further study issues of race and capital punishment? I have previ-
ously published some of my thoughts on the moratorium issue. 39
Here, I hope to provide more specific insights into more basic ques-
tions: What are those federal prosecutors thinking? Are they all just
racists? How can they keep prosecuting these cases?
This assignment requires that I first reveal my own conscious
"bias." I do not believe that most federal prosecutors are racists.40
37. Professor Little clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. in the 1984
to 1985 term.
38. See, e.g., David V. Baker, The Role of Profiling in American Society: Criminal Profiling:
Purposeful Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 5 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENrGES 189, 223 (2003).
Baker notes, with apparent incredulity, that "even in the face of overwhelming proof that race-
based discrimination typifies the imposition of capital punishment in the United Statics," it per-
sists. Id. This view presumes, of course, that statistical race disparity is the product of "discrimi-
nation," a claim that actually bears further consideration, as I indicate below.
39. Little, Moratorium, supra note 4.
40. Some commentators seem to be quick to assume to the contrary, even without probative
facts. For example, David Baker cites a statistic that over 90% of state district attorneys (not
their assistants) are white, and then immediately asserts that this shows that "prosecutorial deci-
sion making may be fraught with racial bias." Baker, supra note 38, at 207-08. This seems.
however, like racial stereotyping of the worst kind: it appears to presume that all white prosecu-
tors are likely to be infused with "racial bias."
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More specifically, I do not believe any federal prosecutor sets out to
prosecute a person for a capital offense or seek the death penalty be-
cause he 4 1 is black (or Latino, or white), or that any federal prosecutor
seeks to treat black or minority defendants worse because of their
ethnicity. 42 Rather, I want to provide you with what I think is actually
the prevailing, race-neutral, rationale of good-hearted federal prose-
cutors for continuing to prosecute federal capital cases in the face of
race disparity statistics.
Finally, before I lift the veil, purposeful discrimination-what I
would call racism-needs to be distinguished from two related con-
cepts: systemic institutional racism and unconscious racial empathy.
Systemic institutional racism, of the sort I have briefly mentioned
above, must be separated, as a legal concept, from purposeful discrim-
ination on an individual basis. If all of our institutions are permeated
by racism, so that the overall product is racial inequality, then individ-
ual death penalty prosecutive decisions can do little to change the situ-
ation and would be an unsatisfying place to begin reform. I intend
here to focus on individual prosecutive decisions in capital cases, put-
ting aside other vitally important issues of institutional racism as ad-
dressed, for example, by Professors Randall Kennedy and David
Cole.43 While, of course, the claim of institutional racism is founded
on the cumulative effect of thousands of individual decisions, it also
masks the individualized nature of any single such decision. This Arti-
cle focuses on the singular thinking of individual prosecutors as a way
of, perhaps, gaining insight into the larger, institutional, issues.
Also to be distinguished from purposeful race bias are the uncon-
scious ethnic biases that all persons, of all races, may hold. I have
previously written about what I call "unconscious race empathy" in
the context of the federal death penalty,44 to which I believe all per-
sons are subject-the unconscious tendency to identify more readily
41. I use "he" because, of course, the most obvious disparity in America's capital punishment
regimes is gender-based. Only fifty-one of 3,557, or only 1.4%, of all persons on death row are
women, despite their 50% representation in the general population. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2002 (revised Feb. 4, 2004) at 1. No woman has
been executed federally since 1953 (Ethyl Rosenberg and Bonnie Brown Heady). See Federal
Executions Since 1927, DPIC website, supra note 6.
42. Thus, I employ the term "racist" here not in the expansive, generalized sense, which at
bottom indicts our entire governmental system, but rather in its more "narrow conventional"
meaning, as Professor William Stuntz does: either a desire to harm, or a malign indifference
toward, minorities. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1798 n.7.
43. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 24; COLE, supra note 27.
44. See Little, History, supra note 4, at 484.
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or more closely with members of one's own ethnic group.45 Such un-
conscious race empathy might well explain why close potential capital
cases-cases that I might colloquially call "leaners" and Professor
Baldus describes as "mid-range" cases in terms of culpability 46-
might go more often against minority defendants. If one assumes that
most federal prosecutors, and their investigators, are white,47 an un-
conscious empathy with white defendants and white victims could ex-
plain a greater proportion of "no death" recommendations in such
cases, as opposed to death-eligible cases with minority defendants, or
victims, or both.48
If one accepts the concept of "unconscious racial empathy," then
the fact that race disparity seems apparent from the earliest stages of
the criminal process-initial investigation and charging decisions-is
perhaps unsurprising, because most criminal law investigators and
prosecutors (at least federally) are white. Yet, as far as I know, no
study of capital prosecutions has ever been done with an eye toward
"race of prosecutor" and "race of investigator. ' 49 Indeed, even the
simple statistics regarding the ethnic make-up of federal prosecutors
and federal law enforcement agents are difficult to assemble. Regard-
ing federal prosecutors, no source I have found reports the ethnicity
of the roughly 5,000 Assistant U.S. Attorneys in this country, although
a recent Department of Justice "Diversity Report" found that 85% of
all Department of Justice lawyers (civil, criminal, and others) are
white, while only 8% are African American. 50 The only other re-
ported study of the racial composition of prosecutors of which I am
aware examines state, not federal, prosecutors. In 1998, Professor Jef-
45. I am hardly the first scholar to identify this phenomena and link it to race disparity statis-
tics. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Sherri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Ra-
cism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
46. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 35, at 185, 318.
47. This is almost certainly more than just an assumption. See infra notes 49-53. See also
Baldus et al., supra note 22, at 1724 ("In many places in the United States, prosecutors, judges,
and penalty trial jurors are predominately white.").
48. Statistical race disparity claims focus on the race of capital defendants. However, the
more stark and consistently demonstrated statistical race effect in capital cases is race of victim:
cases with white victims (and, even more so, black defendants and white victims), yield death
sentences more frequently than other combinations. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 35, at 162,
257, 399; McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
49. In 2000, I was part of a consortium that proposed to conduct such a study of the federal
system. However, a different study group was selected for study by the Department of Justice,
and to date, the details and results of that research effort have been kept well under wraps.
50. Vanessa Blum, Report Offers Detailed Look at DOJ Lawyers: Many Women, Minorities
Find Jobs in Lower Ranks, but Not at the Top, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003. The full DOJ Report
is available at http//www.usdoj.org. (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
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frey Pokorak laboriously assembled statistics on district attorneys (but
not their more numerous and decision-influencing assistants), albeit
only in the thirty-eight death penalty states, and found that over 97%
of them (1,794 of 1,838) were white.51
As for federal criminal investigators, more facts are known: of over
93,000 federal officers authorized to carry firearms and make arrests
in 2002, over 67% were white and less than 12% were African Ameri-
can. 52 These statistics, however, encompass over twenty different fed-
eral agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the U.S. Capital Police, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. More rele-
vant, perhaps, for federal capital cases are the facts that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's agent workforce is over 83% white and less
than 6.5% black, and Drug Enforcement Agency agents are over 82%
white, and less than 8% black.5 3
There is a strong argument that front-line federal prosecutors (as
opposed to Main Justice reviewers) and law enforcement officers are
the most influential decisionmakers in the federal capital arena, de-
spite a review requirement that runs all the way to the Attorney Gen-
eral. 54 That is, it is the agents, and usually not the prosecutors, who
are the first to identify suspects, decide who to pursue and how vigor-
ously. The "case agent" is often the first to recommend the case for
prosecution to a federal prosecutor, and these two (the case agent and
the line prosecutor) often discuss the possibility of capital punishment
together before pushing the case further "up the stream" of supervi-
sion. Absent a desire of these initial actors to go forward on a capital
basis, it is difficult (albeit not impossible) to successfully sustain a cap-
ital effort.
Of course, most potential federal capital cases have some notoriety
immediately, and I am not suggesting that the decision to pursue capi-
tal punishment is made quietly, by only two actors, or without imme-
diate pressure from outside sources. Nevertheless, in my experience
as a federal prosecutor of some eight years, and a supervisor for five
51. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary
Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1817 (1998).
52. Brian A. Reaves & Lynn M. Bauer, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2002, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL., Oct. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fleo02.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
53. Id. at 7. The FBI and DEA are the "lead agencies" in virtually all federal death penalty
cases.
54. Since at least 1988, U.S. Department of Justice regulations-but not the statutes-have
required that the Attorney General personally approve the filing of all federal death penalty
notices. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-10.020, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-roomiusam/title9/l0mcrm.htm#9-10.020 (last visited Apr. 15,
2004); see Little, History, supra note 4, at 407-08 n.325, 436 n.436.
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of those years (the last as a Main Justice reviewer of capital cases), I
firmly believe that the line prosecutor and lead investigators often
have a large, if not primary, influence on the charging and sentencing
contours of potential federal death penalty cases.
Further evidence of this can be found in the fact that the racial
"mix" of federal capital defendants is set by the time potential capital
cases get to Main Justice for review, and it does not change apprecia-
bly once there. 55 Main Justice's capital case review system is "race
blind" and has been since 1996.56 Once a case arrives at Main Justice
for review, it carries with it a recommendation (either death or no
death) from the outlying U.S. Attorney's office, and all race-identify-
ing data is stripped from the file at Main Justice. Thus, the decision at
Main Justice as to whether to approve the case as a capital one is
generally free from racial considerations. Yet the "yield" from this
process, statistically, contains roughly as many black defendants going
out as it did coming in. Thus, it is the initial pool of referrals to Main
Justice that is statistically racially disparate. Racism, if it exists, is oc-
curring earlier in the process. I believe the effects occur at the earliest
stages: case investigation and prosecutorial intake.
By definition, however, unconscious empathic bias cannot be identi-
fied and corrected by the unconscious individual actors. Institutional
responses are necessary to eliminate, or correct for, such unconscious
influences. What I want to address now is what individual federal
prosecutors, attempting to act in a good-faith, race-neutral way, con-
sciously think about their capital prosecutions.
V. WHAT FEDERAL PROSECUTORS REALLY THINK: THEIR
DEFENDANTS ARE ALL GUILTY AND ARE
ALL TIMOTHY MCVEIGH
Having concluded my substantial throat-clearing, let me tell you
what federal prosecutors really think: They think that the defendants
they prosecute are guilty. In the capital context, really guilty. No
matter what statistics may say generally, federal prosecutors think that
their individual defendants deserve the death penalty on the specific
facts presented. They think this regardless of other systemic or insti-
tutional problems, which they believe they can do little to correct.
They have reviewed their cases and found no overt evidence of
racism.57
55. See Little, Moratorium, supra note 4, at 810.
56. Little, History, supra note 4, at 411-12.
57. My account assumes that if federal prosecutors do find evidence of overt racism in their
pursuit of a potential capital case, they will address it and not ignore or bury it. Thus, a racist
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Thus, federal prosecutors are unwilling to drop cases against spe-
cific, heinous defendants as a response to some general problem they
do not find present in their specific cases. They are prosecuting spe-
cific, guilty, horrible people. Unless the death penalty is entirely abol-
ished-a policy decision that is "above their pay grade," as they see
it-federal prosecutors simply do not understand the abolitionist's
perspective. Instead they think, "This person is guilty and deserves
the death penalty. 58 Why would we drop a prosecution of this specifi-
cally guilty and morally repellent person, in response to problems not
present in this case?" Thus, federal capital prosecutors are at the
other end of the logical disconnect that some see in their position.
This is the problem with translating general race disparity statistics
into specific prosecutorial action. It is the problem of the general ver-
sus the specific.5 9 Even assuming that federal prosecutors are unques-
tioningly aware of the race disparity statistics, and that they recognize
that, as a general matter, the race statistics generated by the system as
a whole are "troubling," they still do not believe that their individual
cases are the product of anything other than race-neutral, specific
facts-and usually screamingly heinous specific facts. Before federal
prosecutors charge a federal capital case, they thoroughly examine
their case files looking for flaws. Such "flaws" could include evidence
of racial bias, or some other misconduct, or simply evidentiary flaws.
(If federal prosecutors are not doing this, it is unethical incompetence,
pure and simple.) And if they find such flaws, they respond accord-
ingly, which could include not charging the case capitally or even not
charging it at all. Federal prosecutors who find evidence of overt race
bias in their cases do not-or certainly, ought not-ignore or bury it.
It is too strategically risky-let alone ethically disturbing-to let such
sleeping issues lie.60
remark from an investigator, major witness, or fellow prosecutor, should be addressed and
brought to the attention of supervisors. Appropriate discipline should be considered. Most im-
portantly, the case should be thoroughly and independently reviewed to ensure that racial con-
siderations have not materially affected the investigative or charging decisions in the case.
58. See TURow, supra note 35, at 64 ("The issue is not revenge or retribution, exactly, so much
as moral order .... [Clapital punishment makes an unequivocal moral statement.").
59. This is the same difficulty confronted in McCleskey: specific jury decisions about guilt
were held to outweigh, or overweigh, a strong statistical showing of generalized racial disparity.
"The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment
on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 311 (1987) (emphasis added).
60. For example, the failure of the O.J. Simpson prosecutors to surface and address the
overtly racist remarks of one of the investigating Las Angeles Police Department officers, Mark
Fuhrman, was viewed as a large contributing factor in the ultimate not guilty verdicts. See An-
drew E. Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact: The O.J. Trial and Black Judges on Justice, 7
B.U. PUB. lr. L.J. 219, 244 & nn. 162-64 (1998).
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But what a federal prosecutor will not do-indeed, what no prose-
cutor will ever do-is stop prosecuting an individual case that does
not exhibit such specific flaws as a response to some general prob-
lem-even a problem genuinely existing and generally recognized, but
not present in his or her individual case. Federal prosecutors think:
"It's not present in my case." They believe their capital defendants
are first, factually guilty of the murder(s) and, second, factually de-
serving of the death penalty. Only specific, individualized evidence,
specific to each case, can change this prosecutive decision once it has
been carefully made. Generalized concerns about capital case results
simply do not translate into case-specific action.61
So, what federal prosecutors really think is, while there may be sys-
temic problems with the administration of capital cases, those
problems have not infected their specific cases. And, absent an indi-
vidualized reason not to go forward, they think deserving death-eligi-
ble murderers should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Even if racism in fact permeates our society so that poor black youths
have less chance of avoiding the criminal justice system, and even if
that system then generates drastically disproportionate results along
racial lines, those institutional problems cannot be solved by dropping
their specific case. 62
When actual federal death penalty cases are examined, it is easy,
perhaps, to understand this thinking. Let's take the easiest case first:
Timothy McVeigh, otherwise known as "the poster child for the fed-
eral death penalty. '63 McVeigh was a white male who intentionally
blew up the Oklahoma City building in 1995 and killed 168 people,
nineteen of them children whom he could see through the second-
floor daycare windows as he parked his truck full of explosives. 64 His
is the quintessential "high end" case, which Professor Baldus's
landmark study and others have suggested produce no "race bias" ef-
61. This is not to say we cannot build in systemic protection against the influences of racism
for future cases as a response to identified potential problem areas. We can, and we should. See
infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
62. See COLE, supra note 27, at 183 (noting that one "obstacle to remedying the criminal
justice system's disparate treatment ... is that any solution . . . is likely to be constrained by
forces beyond the system"). Cf. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 ("Even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove that race ... was a factor in McClesky's particular case.").
63. The label is mine, used in any number of past presentations. Accord Richard Willing,
Even for Death Penalty Foes, McVeigh Is the Exception: Worst Mass Murderer in U.S. History
Tilts Debate over Capital Punishment, USA TODAY, May 4, 2001, at 1A.
64. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998).
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fect-that is, defendants in high-end cases routinely are selected for
capital prosecution and verdicts, without regard to race.65
Should a federal prosecutor decline to seek the ultimate penalty for
Timothy McVeigh because of statistical race disparity in the overall
administration of the federal death penalty? For prosecutors, at least,
that question answers itself: No. Is the rationale for this answer too
self-evident to state? McVeigh was undisputedly guilty. As a white
male, he made no claim (and had no plausible claim) of race bias.
Meanwhile, his crime, the harm caused, and his unrepentant lack of
remorse, easily fit the profile of a deserving, highly aggravated capital
case.
But, more modestly, perhaps, should we impose a "moratorium" on
Timothy McVeigh's execution, while we study the system for insidious
sources of race bias and examine new ways to protect against it?
Again, prosecutors would generally respond no-even clear findings
of race bias, and new mechanisms to protect against it, would do no
good for Timothy McVeigh. 66 His was a clear case of guilt, heinous
facts, and absence of race bias. Unless one is an opponent of all capi-
tal punishment, race disparity ought not stay McVeigh's capital prose-
cution or execution.
Bluntly put, federal prosecutors think that there are only "Timothy
McVeighs" on federal death row: heinously guilty men (there are no
women; talk about bias!) whose guilt is frankly undisputed.67 As I
have previously described, the result of the federal death penalty sys-
tem-in contrast to any state systems of significance-has been, so
far, to place only "high-end" males on federal death row.68 That is,
what I call the "Stevens Solution" (after Justice John Paul Stevens's
dissenting opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp 69) has actually been imple-
65. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 35, at 151. ("[W]hen the crime involved was ...
extremely aggravated .... " death sentences were imposed "regardless of racial factors.").
66. See Little, Moratorium, supra note 4, at 811-812.
67. See, for example, the cases of David Hammer (murdered his cellmate), Marvin Gabrian
(murdered four white victims including a three-year-old child), Keith Nelson (kidnapped and
murdered a ten-year-old girl), and Richard Jackson (kidnapped, raped, and murdered a twenty-
two-year-old woman). DPIC website, supra note 6 (Federal Death Row: Synopsis of Cases).
68. Little, Moratorium, supra note 4, at 800-07. As I mentioned in that article (id. at 805), the
case of federal death row occupant Jeffrey Paul gives me pause, not on the axis of guilt in the
evidence in the public record, but on the axis of "heinousness" (not very) and identifiable fed-
eral interest (none that I can see other than that the crime was committed on federal parkland).
Paul has a significant federal habeas corpus petition pending, and it remains to be seen whether
he will remain on death row.
69. 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants to those categories [of "extremely serious" murders], the danger of arbitrary
and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not
eradicated.")
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mented de facto in the administration of the federal death penalty.
Only high-end, factually-compelling and innocence-claim-free defend-
ants make it through the entire federal capital case review system to
death row intact.70 So long as this remains true,71 it is difficult to see
how race disparity statistics alone would stop their prosecution.
But perhaps McVeigh's case is too easy-the sort of exception that
might prove the rule. Let us then briefly examine other cases cur-
rently on federal death row. But before we do, let me say this. I
firmly believe that every federal capital case should receive the most
thorough examination possible, both before and after the prosecution,
for the existence of problems known to have infected capital prosecu-
tions in general: race bias, prosecutorial or investigatorial misconduct,
substantial trial error, and (perhaps most importantly) plausible
claims of innocence (this should include "penalty innocence"). 72 In-
deed, I think federal executions are so important that I would advo-
cate a second layer of Department of Justice review, by a team of
independent and experienced federal lawyers, of each federal death
penalty case prior to the final execution date. I do not think that the
federal government should execute if responsible attorneys have lin-
gering doubts. This does not mean that a prosecutor's trial or other
70. One might think there is irony here: the "Stevens Solution" has been de facto imple-
mented in the federal system, and yet statistical race disparity persists, seemingly in defiance of
Professor Baldus's finding that race disparity drops out in high-end capital cases. However,
while this seems true in individual cases, the federal system still has no controls for race at the
"front end" of case investigation and initiation. Also, the Baldus study showed no race-dispari-
ties for high-end cases after controlling for dozens of other variables. BALDUS ET AL., supra note
35, at 62-66, 397. The federal results have not (yet) been so carefully filtered.
71. There is anecdotal information emerging to suggest that the current administration under
Attorney General John Ashcroft may be lowering the standard of aggravation for approval of
federal capital prosecutions. See generally John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punish-
ment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the
Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1697-98 & n.2 (2003). The Federal Death Penalty Counsel
group reports that, of the last twenty-two federal capital cases to go to trial, only one has re-
sulted in a death verdict, while three have resulted in complete acquittals and seventeen in life
sentences. Adam Liptak, U.S. Joins Request To Delay a Capital Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003,
at A10. If this is so, it is a disturbing trend because much of the validity of the federal capital
system, in the face of mounting criticism of death penalty regimes in general, has been staked on
its careful selection of highly aggravated, clearly-guilty cases.
72. The best federal example of penalty innocence might be the case of Ronald Chandler, who
claimed that the murder he allegedly directed had, in fact, been perpetrated by the actual killer
for personal reasons (the victim had allegedly abused the killer's sister and mother) and not for
the aggravating reasons that made the death penalty available. Chandler's case evenly divided
the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (having the effect of affirming
his death sentence), see Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 2000), and President
Clinton commuted his death sentence in his last days in office. See Little, The Future of the
Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHio N.U. L. REV. 529, 530 n.12, 567-69 (2000); Little, Moratorium,
supra note 4, at 791 n.2.
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strategic decisions, or a jury's determination of "justification" for the
capital sanction under the statute, should be second-guessed or over-
ruled based simply upon hindsight disagreement. Placing our faith in
prosecutorial discretion and in juries is required by statute and (the
Supreme Court has recently indicated) the Constitution.73 But an in-
ternal Department of Justice process of secondary review, after a
death sentence is imposed but prior to execution, by an independent
team with sufficient experience and institutional protection to make
completely independent recommendations to the Attorney General,
could provide one final check against excesses, errors, and biases.
Call it the "Department of Justice Innocence Review Unit." Such a
review would not have to require great delay or expenditures; it could
be conducted concurrently with the appellate process, or speedily af-
ter the defendant's first (and, legally, only) habeas petition is finally
declined. Secure independence, however, and not unwarranted speed,
is the key to this idea. Such a system would create even more public
confidence in the system and further demonstrate the excellence of
the federal system.
But, one could say, that's all well and good about Timothy McVeigh
and other heinous white defendants on federal death row-but of
course, they are not the object of our concern. What about the black
defendants in the federal system? They are the ones "obviously"
harmed by race bias.74 What about them?
There are, of course, more of them than there are white defendants
on federal death row. But I am constrained to say, upon examination
of their cases, that it is difficult to separate them from what I have said
about McVeigh, because of the highly aggravated and innocence-free
nature of their cases.
Again, it is easiest to take the simplest cases first: Anthony Battle,
for example, who murdered an African-American federal prison
guard with a hammer while already serving a life sentence for the
murder of his wife;75 or Darryl Johnson, who was convicted for di-
recting two murders as a leader in a drug-dealing gang-one victim
was a confidential government witness against Johnson-and is al-
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311-
12; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
74. Note, however, that white federal defendants have also alleged race bias since the 2000
DOJ study came out, claiming that whites are being "over selected" in order to "make up for"
the prior disparities. None of these claims has been found plausible by a reviewing court,
however.
75. United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1997), affd, 173 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022 (2000). Battle claimed to be insane, but the jury rejected this
defense. Id. at 1469.
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leged to have directed four more;76 or Aquila Barnette, who mur-
dered the driver of the car he randomly hijacked in North Carolina on
his way to successfully murder his former girlfriend in Virginia.77 Or
the eight other black defendants on federal death row who have been
convicted of multiple victim homicides. 78 Frankly, none of the cases
of black defendants on federal death row involve anything other than
aggravated facts.79 More importantly, none of these cases involve
claims of actual innocence. Many include undisputed confessions to
the murders. So far as I am aware, none are founded primarily on
claims of misidentification, doubtful confession, or questionable jail-
house or codefendant snitches, and in all, the government placed sub-
stantial amounts of corroborating evidence before the jury.
Now let me be clear: I am not saying that all of these cases are
flawless or that they uniformly embody indisputably valid convictions
and sentences. It is too early to say that about some-Julius Robin-
son, for example (a drug-gang leader convicted of three homicides),
has not yet had even his first appeal. The federal system, while better
than others, is far from perfect. And, significantly, since 1988 there
have been five federal capital defendants taken off of death row by
judicial (and in one additional case, presidential) intervention.80 My
view is that this is evidence that the overall federal system works and
catches errors-but it also makes it clear that no capital system is
flawless. Particularly given the anecdotal evidence that the current
Administration is lowering federal capital case aggravation standards,
we cannot become blasd about the federal, or any other, capital pun-
ishment regime. Constant vigilance is, indeed, a cost of liberty.
In addition, there are currently sixty-nine defendants awaiting fed-
eral capital trials whose cases have not yet been developed suffi-
ciently, let alone judicially reviewed, to make a judgment about their
legitimacy. Nevertheless, brief summaries of their facts, even as writ-
ten by federal defense counsel, suggest that many, if not all, fit the
aggravated profile of federal capital cases provided above.81
But this is becoming tangential. My point is that, so far as I know,
in none of the current black-defendant federal death row cases has
76. United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2000).
77. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
78. See David Bruck et al., Summaries of Cases Authorized for the Death Penalty: 1988-2002,
at http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/summaries of-cases/casesummframe.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2004).
79. See supra note 70 (speculating that aggravated facts, and not race, may explain their pres-
ence on federal death row).
80. DPIC Website, supra note 6.
81. See Bruck et al., supra note 78.
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there ever been offered any specific evidence of overt race bias, in
their prosecution or their capital selection. Their facts are aggravated,
their claims of innocence are implausible or nonexistent, and their
cases have been reviewed by many lawyers and judges alike. What is
a federal prosecutor handling one of these cases to think when he or
she is told that statistical race disparities are being generated sys-
temwide? That he or she should, therefore, drop the capital prosecu-
tion of such heinous individual defendants? I emphasize the
"therefore" because it is the causal link suggested by that word that
federal prosecutors see as missing from their specific cases. How will
dropping the death penalty against their adjudgedly guilty, heinous,
and deserving defendant (black or white) advance the cause of race
equality? Particularly when the victims are also black-as is true for
at least nine of the fifteen black defendants on federal death row8 2-
how is racial justice served by dropping their otherwise seemingly
valid prosecutions? 83
Again we have the problem of the specific versus the general. Even
a federal prosecutor who is genuinely troubled by general race dispar-
ity in the system is not going to drop a patently legitimate specific case
as a response, whether the defendant is black or white.84
VI. WHAT CAN WE Do ABOUT IT? WORKING TOWARD A
FAIRER (NOT ABOLISHED) CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM
In sum, opponents of capital punishment who argue that recognized
statistical race disparities are a reason to drop capital prosecutions,
face a significant hurdle. Federal prosecutors-indeed, prosecutors of
all stripes-do not think that generalized statistical race disparities are
a logical reason to drop any specific prosecution (capital or other-
wise). They believe there is a logical disconnect between the two
82. Id.
83. See Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, 3rd Defendant Gets Life Sentence in Jasper Man's
Dragging Death, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 19, 1999, at Al (discussing case in which three white
defendants, at least two of whom belonged to white supremacy groups, offered a disabled black
man a ride in their truck and then chained him to its rear bumper and dragged him to his death):
King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (affirming conviction and death penalty).
But see George Kendall, Remarks at the DePaul University College of Law Race to Execution
Symposium (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with the DePaul Law Review) (criticizing use of
"tabloid journalism" to raise emotions regarding capital cases).
84. A further claim, that black (but not white) capital defendants should be benefitted due to
statistical race disparity, without specific problems of race evidenced in their cases, is itself a kind
of race consciousness that is troubling and pretty obviously not constitutional. To be fair, I do
not know of any scholar who has recommended such race-conscious relief in the capital context.
But cf Butler, supra note 31, at 679 (arguing that, in light of systemic racism, "it is the moral
responsibility of black jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws").
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ideas, a lack of causal relationship that is insurmountable in their
minds.
In this sense, it does not matter what race Timothy McVeigh, or any
other aggravated killer, is. Indeed, as studies have repeatedly shown,
race largely drops out in the face of extremely serious case-specific
aggravation. For prosecutors, and indeed most Americans, Timothy
McVeigh and his moral equivalents (of any ethnicity) loom too largely
in the opposite direction to justify banning the death penalty entirely,
let alone dropping any particular aggravated case unless case-specific
problems are shown.8 5
Given this logical difficulty, this general verses specific "Timothy
McVeigh problem," it seems more fruitful to me to work for incre-
mental improvements in the system. I recognize that some opponents
of capital punishment believe that working to improve the system is
counter-productive: a system that works badly is more likely to per-
suade people to the abolitionist position than one that is free of com-
plaints other than the penalty itself. However, as one who is agnostic
about whether Timothy McVeigh should live or die, I cannot share
that view. A capital punishment system that is free of race bias seems,
to me, better than one that is not. Thus, limiting the system to "high-
end" aggravated cases only, in which race bias seems to disappear,
seems like a worthy goal. Eliminating or greatly reducing reliance on
other now-recognized problem factors, such as eyewitness misidentifi-
cations, coerced confessions, and lying snitches8 6 should also be at-
tempted. Legislators should work to refine and narrow their statutes
to eliminate the disparate unevenness of existing "mid-range" capital
punishment systems.
Thus, there are a range of improvements that can and should be
made to capital punishment systems in America today, some specific
to the federal system, others more general.
First, for example, are the improvements recently adopted in Illi-
nois, as a result of that states's remarkable experience with actually
innocent capital defendants, subsequent moratorium, and the result-
ing Report of the Commission on Capital Punishment.8 7
85. Willing, supra note 63 (reporting "that of the 38% of Americans who say they generally
oppose the death penalty, more than half have come to believe that McVeigh should be executed
anyway").
86. See the landmark explication about the unjust influence of such factors in SCHECK ET AL.,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
87. The Report is available at www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/index.html. (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
Noted author (and lawyer) Scott Turow has published an astute and eminently readable account
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Second, we should strive to eliminate categorical areas of identified
problems from the pool of "death-eligible" offenses. Thus, a legisla-
ture can, and should, require that no case may go forward as a capital
prosecution if the Government's case would be based primarily (not
solely, which is too easy to manipulate) on: (1) a single eye-witness
identification; (2) a confession unless judicially determined to be relia-
ble beyond doubt; (3) "junk" science; and (4) either jailhouse or other
"flipped" criminal snitches, who have proven over time to be far too
amenable to their obvious incentives to lie.
Third, we should restrict capital punishment to "high-end" cases
with defined, extremely aggravating, factors. This could be done stat-
utorily or as a matter of prosecutorial policy. But it would necessitate
removing certain vague or too easily manipulated statutory "aggravat-
ing" factors that are commonly used today, such as "heinous or atro-
cious," "committed for pecuniary gain," or "committed in conjunction
with another felony.""" More individualized or clearly defined, and
limiting, words will have to be used instead. For example, "multiple
victims," "tortuous killing beyond the norm of common murders,"
"victim particularly vulnerable by reason of youth (under eighteen),
age (over sixty-five), or mental incapacity (mentally retarded, etc),"
and "hired assassin killing. '89
Inevitably, when death-eligible categories are so narrowed, there
will be cases that some might feel still merit the death penalty but that
fall outside the narrowed categories. But-and this is important and
too easily overlooked-there should be no "catch all" category to ad-
dress this perceived problem. Instead, "erring" on the side of no-
death in close or unanticipated cases is simply a "cost" of having a
truly limited, high-end, capital punishment system. Selection of some
killers for life-without-parole sentences, which may seem arbitrary in
an individualized case analysis, is actually a certain and necessary re-
sult of any good faith semantic effort to limit capital prosecutions to
those cases in which nefarious considerations such as race will not play
even an unconscious role. Could the result be to bring us closer to a
of his experience as a member of the Illinois Commission and a very balanced account of the
current capital punishment debate in general. See TUROW, supra note 35.
88. See Little, History, supra note 4, at 490-500 (discussing the manipulability of language in
capital statutes).
89. Professor Andrea Lyon has pointed out to me that even these terms may not be adequate.
"Multiple victims," for example, can sweep in too broad a range of cases, from the quick panic
shooting of store owners in a robbery, to (for example) the intentional starvation of children or
terrorist killing of hundreds. I agree that intense work and debate should be had on every term
before it is included in a capital statute. The goal is to find semantics that truly will limit the
death penalty to high-end killers, without being amenable to mid-range manipulation. See Little,
History, supra note 4, at 490-500.
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death penalty so rarely imposed that it echoes Justice Potter Stewart's
arbitrary "in the same way that being struck by lightning" is arbitrary
critique in Furman v. Georgia?90 I think not-not in the sense of be-
ing totally unpredictable or seemingly indistinguishable between
death-eligible and ineligible cases. Rather, such a system would self-
consciously limit "lightning" to a narrow group of aggravated killers
and allow some to escape death due to the inevitable inadequacy of
legislative action, semantics, or lawyering. Yes, such a system will (a)
yield fewer actual death penalties, and (b) leave some serious murders
unpenalized by death. But it will also leave us far more confident that
only high-end killers are being selected for the penalty and with no
lingering statistical race disparity concerns. These are costs and bene-
fits of a fair and unbiased system that supporters must be prepared to
accept in the face of the clear evidence of race disparity, and actual
innocence, that has come to be so widely accepted in the last ten
years.
Fourth, trial judges must become far more rigorous in enforcing the
command of Batson v. Kentucky. 91 We cannot allow the subterfuge of
''race-neutral explanation" to achieve the insidious effect of routinely
eliminating African-American jurors from capital juries.92 Judges
have full discretion to order that stricken African-American jurors re-
main when the circumstances suggest impermissible race-based
strikes. 93 The willingness of trial judges to silently accept the practice
of disguised, race-based juror strikes must come to an end. Moreover,
appellate courts must be fearless in reversing when it is evident that
the trial court has failed.94
As for the federal death penalty process in particular, a number of
improvements should also be made. First, as described above, the fed-
eral system, at least, should institute a final, internal, but professional
and independent review, of all cases that result in a death sentence. A
final Department of Justice "Innocence Review" before federal ex-
90. 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972).
91. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Accord COLE, supra note 27, at 188-89.
92. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (per curium) (holding that a proffered "neu-
tral" explanation need not be "persuasive" or even "reasonable" to suffice under Batson) is an
example of a failure to administer Batson effectively. See id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Judicial tolerance of "silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations" interferes with "meaningful
judicial review.").
93. See People v. Johnson, 30 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2003), cert granted, 124 S.Ct. 817 (2003) (address-
ing how easily provable the standard, or "trigger," for establishing a prima facie Batson case
should be).
94. See, e.g., Miller-el v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985).
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ecutions will provide strong public support for the results, even in the
face of increasing concern over state systems.
Second, there must be strict enforcement of the "substantial federal
interest" requirement for federal capital prosecutions, and the Ash-
croft amendment to the protocols that allow the availability of the
death penalty itself to fulfill this requirement should be abolished.95
Most murder cases should remain at the state level, and the simple
fact that a state has chosen not to enact a death penalty should not be
sufficient without a more identifiable "federal" interest to drive a case
into the federal system.96
Finally, further study is required. Race bias, if it is a significant fac-
tor, would seem to have its largest influence at the very earliest stages
of the capital case investigative and prosecutive process. I have noted
above that the race of federal criminal investigators or the "line" fed-
eral prosecutors could have an influence here. 97 Yet there are no
studies of these factors in capital decision making of which I am
aware. Study should be conducted, in the federal system, of the influ-
ences of "race of case agent" (the agent or agents identified as having
initial or primary authority for any particular potential capital case),
and "race of line Assistant U.S. Attorney," (the Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney who is first contacted about a potential capital case or is given
initial responsibility for further investigation and prosecutive recom-
mendations). If there is no detectable or overt race bias here, then the
Department of Justice will have nothing to fear from such a study, and
substantial amounts of public trust to gain. On the other hand, if
these are potential sources of identifiable race bias, then responsible
governmental figures should prefer to investigate, and do what can be
done to ameliorate, the situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Statistical race disparity does not prove purposeful racial discrimi-
nation in federal capital prosecutions. Nevertheless, it is a persistent
95. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-10.070, available at http:l/www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/10mcrm.htm#9-10.070 (last visited Apr. 15,
2004); see Little, History, supra note 4, at 413-14 (discussing "federal interest" requirement).
Under Attorney General Janet Reno, the DOJ Capital Case Protocols provided that "the fact
that the maximum Federal penalty is death is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more sub-
stantial interest [than a state's] in federal prosecution." This provision was repealed in 2001
under Attorney General Ashcroft.
96. See Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government Work? The Tension Between Uniform-
ity and Differing Regional Values in Administering the Federal Death Penalty, 14 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 7 (2001).
97. See also Little, History, supra note 4.
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and disturbing fact. Lingering doubts remain that it occurs due to sub-
conscious or attenuated systemic biases impossible to isolate or detect,
but which are harmful nevertheless.
However, generalized race disparity alone cannot logically require
dismissal of deserving capital prosecutions in the minds of prosecutors
who have carefully determined the facts and fairness of their individ-
ual cases. Arguments about race disparity will never persuade sup-
porters of capital punishment to the position of abolition, or even
moratorium, for guilty, heinous, "high-end" killers. Indeed, "race dis-
parity" appears to disappear in such high-end cases.
On the other hand, reform of existing capital punishment structures,
to truly narrow and limit their results to such indisputable high-end
cases, is a solution that can appeal to supporters and opponents alike.
Legislators and prosecutorial policymakers should turn their attention
to such reforms now.98 The perfect should not be the enemy of the
good. A narrowed, but bias-free, capital punishment system would be
better than what we currently have.
98. Such efforts are already underway in a number of states. See Laura Mansnerus, States
Seek Ways to Make Executions Error Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5.
1614 [Vol. 53:1591
